Original Article

Conflict, Elections and the Politics of Winner-Takes-All in Africa

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ABSTRACT

This paper investigates the complex dynamics of elections, conflict, and the pervasive winner-takes-all politics in Africa. Winner-takes-all politics has significant implications for democracy, governance, and social stability in the region. Firstly, the paper explores the concept of winner-takes-all politics, defining it as a system where the victor in an election claims all the power and resources, marginalizing opposition groups and fostering a zero-sum political environment. This approach often results in exclusion, inequality, and heightened political tensions. Secondly, the paper investigates the causes of winner-takes-all politics in Africa, highlighting factors such as historical legacies, ethnic divisions, weak institutions, resource curse and international influence. Subsequently, the paper examines the winner-takes-all landscape in selected African countries, presenting case studies that illustrate how this political practice manifests in different contexts and its impact on governance and social cohesion. The discussion section critically analyses the implications of winner-takes-all politics on democracy, conflict resolution, and nation-building in Africa. Furthermore, the paper explores potential solutions to mitigate the negative effects of winner-takes-all politics, emphasizing the importance of inclusive governance, electoral reforms, and power-sharing mechanisms.

INTRODUCTION

In the complex tapestry of political landscapes across the globe, Africa stands out as a continent grappling with a myriad of challenges, many of which are deeply entrenched in its socio-political fabric. One such phenomenon that has cast a long shadow over the continent's development and stability is the politics of "winner-takes-it-all" (WTA). The term "winner-takes-all" encapsulates a political system in which the victor of an election claims the entirety of power, resources, and opportunities, leaving little to no room for meaningful participation or representation by the opposition or minority groups (Cheeseman, *et al.*, 2014). In the African context, winner-takes-all dynamics have been a recurring theme in the continent's political landscape, contributing to power imbalances, social unrest, and prolonged conflicts. Understanding the causes of winner-takes-all in Africa requires a nuanced examination of historical, institutional, and socio-economic factors that have shaped the political systems in various countries. From colonial legacies and post-independence power struggles to weak institutions and lack of inclusive governance structures, the roots of WTA can be traced back to a complex interplay of forces that have perpetuated a winner-centric approach to politics in many African nations (Ball & Peters, 2005).

This paper provides an overview of the winner-takes-all landscape in Africa, shedding light on the patterns, trends, and consequences of this phenomenon in Rwanda, Zimbabwe, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Ivory Coast, South Sudan, Eritrea, Burundi, Cameroon, Uganda, Ethiopia, Mali, Central African Republic, Chad and Nigeria. We examine case studies and empirical data to determine how WTA affects governance, democracy, social cohesion, and economic growth in Africa, highlighting both its evident and subtle effects. Furthermore, the consequences of winner-takes-all go well beyond politics; they penetrate African cultures' social fabric and exacerbate already-existing rifts. Winner-takes-all regimes usually lead to anger, marginalization, and disenchantment among those who lose, which fosters conflict, instability, and violence.

The paper also explores potential solutions and pathways towards more inclusive, participatory, and sustainable political systems by drawing on best practices, lessons learned, and innovative approaches from both within and outside the continent.

DEFINING WINNER-TAKES-ALL POLITICS

According to Hacker and Pierson (2010), winner-takes-all politics can be seen as a zero-sum game where one party's gain is perceived as another's loss, leading to fierce competition for power. In such a system, the winning political party excludes opposition parties from meaningful participation in governance. It is also a patronage-based politics where the victorious party controls state resources and distributes them as patronage to supporters, often sidelining meritocracy (Oruwari, 2007). Hill (2002), on his part, defines winner-takes-all politics as a situation where the winning party uses its electoral victory to legitimize autocratic rule.

For Denley (2007), winner-takes-all politics refers to the centralization of political authority in the hands of the winning party often at the expense of checks and balances. It is a process by which the victors in the political contest gain control over state resources and use them for their own benefit. Ayelazuno (2011) sees it as a system where the political victory results in the neglect or active discrimination against minority groups within the

country, many at times leading to the erosion of democratic norms.

Gyampo (2015) views winner-takes-all politics as a state of affairs where one party consistently wins elections, leading to a lack of genuine competition and plurality in the political arena. This often leads to two phenomena. One is "Judicial Capture" where the winning party exerts undue influence over the judiciary, undermining the rule of law and the separation of powers. The other is "Media Manipulation" where there is excessive and unnecessary control or influence of the media by the winning party to propagate its agenda and stifle opposition voices. Attafuah (2013) avers that winner-takes-all politics plays out when the victors in an election amend the constitution to entrench their power and limit the opportunities for others to challenge them. In its severe form, the ruling party gains control over state institutions and uses them to advance their interests. In some cases, a winner-takes-all political system also gives rise to "post-election retribution"- a situation in which the victorious party punishes people or communities that backed the opposition (Obi, 2007).

CAUSES OF WINNER-TAKES-ALL IN AFRICA

Historical Legacy and Colonial Impact

According to Herbst (2000), European colonial powers imposed arbitrary borders, which resulted in the merging of various ethnic groups into single geographical units. The newly independent states inherited the colonial administrative systems, which were designed for extraction and control rather than inclusive government. As a consequence, the political elites that emerged after independence frequently employed techniques that were comparable to the winner-takes-all approach in order to consolidate power and control resources (Mamdani, 1996). The lack of power-sharing tradition and the focus placed on a centralized authority both led to the formation of authoritarian regimes and a zero-sum approach to politics (Bolt &

Leigh, 2020). In these regimes, losing power meant being completely excluded from the rewards of political and economic life.

Ethnic Fractionalization and Mobilization

In situations where political competition coincides with ethnic tensions, the winner-takes-all political strategy is known to be highly effective. Politicians cash in on ethnic identities to garner support, which ultimately results in voting patterns and political alliances that are based on ethnicity (Posner, 2004). The fear of marginalization for ethnic groups should their representatives lose elections might heighten the level of competitiveness and make the stakes higher. According to Horowitz (1985), this type of political mobilization can result in a cycle in which the winning group consolidates power for the benefit of its members while excluding others. This, in turn, heightens ethnic tensions and the determination of each group to control the apparatus of the state.

Weak Institutions and Governance Challenges

A great number of African states are plagued by weak institutions that are easily manipulated by those who hold power (Powell, 2000). There are many instances in which judicial systems, electoral commissions, and other institutions that are supposed to serve as checks and balances do not possess the independence and capability required to function effectively. The winner-takes-all politics that are prevalent today are both a cause and a result of this institutional weakness. According to Lindberg (2006), when institutions are unable to assure fair play, the political arena transforms into a battleground where the victor has the opportunity to further degrade institutions in order to keep their hold on power.

Resource Curse and Economic Factors

The 'resource curse' is a phenomenon where countries with abundant natural resources tend to have less economic growth and worse development outcomes than countries with fewer natural

resources (Auty, 1993). In many African countries, control of the state is synonymous with control over lucrative resources such as oil, diamonds, and minerals. This creates a high incentive for political actors to adopt a dominance-seeking strategy to secure access to these resources and the wealth they generate. Moreover, the lack of diversified economies in many African countries means there are limited sources of wealth and employment outside state control. Consequently, politics becomes a primary avenue for economic advancement, intensifying competition and the desire to capture the state at all costs (Daniele, 2011).

International Influence and Aid Dependency

Winner-takes-all politics in Africa is also fueled by external factors. Some countries provide incumbent regimes with financial resources often tagged "foreign aid" which they deploy to maintain their dominance. This may unwittingly contribute to the centralization of power. Foreign aid accounts for 7 percent of revenue for many African countries (Moyo, 2009). As a region, Africa accounts for approximately 20 percent of US aid, with Egypt, Kenya and South Sudan being the biggest beneficiaries. Moreover, some superpowers' geopolitical objectives might occasionally result in their backing for African authoritarian leaders who are viewed as reliable allies despite their anti-democratic actions (Karras, 2006). Furthermore, the global democratic movement has frequently placed more emphasis on how elections are conducted than on the effectiveness of democratic procedures. This has occasionally led to "electoralism," in which the emphasis is placed on conducting elections—regardless of its flaws—instead of creating the institutions and culture required for true democracy (Carothers, 2002).

Figure 1: WINNER-TAKES-ALL LANDSCAPE IN SELECTED AFRICAN COUNTRIES

LEGEND

🟨 : Countries selected for the study

Source: *Author's configuration*

The winner-takes-all system has proven problematic in Africa (Abotsi, 2013). In the context of Rwanda, winner-takes-all politics played a significant role in fueling the conflict between the Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups. Rwanda has a history of colonial rule by Belgium, during which the Tutsi minority was favoured over the majority Hutu population (Byilingiro, 2002). This created a deep-seated resentment among the Hutu population, leading to social and political tensions that continued even after Rwanda gained independence. In the lead-up to the genocide in 1994, the ruling government under President Juvenal Habyarimana was dominated by Hutu extremists who used dominance-oriented politics to consolidate power and exclude the Tutsi minority from political participation (Destexhe, 1996). The government's policies exacerbated ethnic divisions and fueled hatred and violence against the Tutsi population. This environment of exclusion, combined with long-standing ethnic tensions, propaganda, and incitement to violence, ultimately culminated in the genocide in which an estimated 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus were killed in a span of 100 days (Adelman & Suhrke, 1999).

Absolute power politics has also played a significant role in the political landscape of Zimbabwe, contributing to political polarization, authoritarianism, and economic challenges in the country. Zimbabwe has a history of zero-sum politics, particularly under the rule of former President Robert Mugabe and his party, ZANU-PF (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003). Robert Mugabe, who came to power in 1980 after Zimbabwe's independence from British colonial rule, adopted a dominance-oriented approach to governance, concentrating power within his party and marginalizing political opposition (Saunders, 2000). The ruling party, ZANU-PF, employed tactics such as electoral manipulation, intimidation, and repression to maintain its grip on power, leading to a lack of political pluralism and accountability (Mair & Sithole, 2002). Under Mugabe's rule, total victory politics resulted in the consolidation of power and resources in the hands of a few elites within ZANU-PF, while opposition parties and dissenting voices were suppressed. This lack of political inclusivity and transparency contributed to economic mismanagement, corruption, and a decline in democratic institutions (Moyo, 1992). The winner-takes-everything political environment in Zimbabwe also had negative implications for the country's economy, as policies were often implemented to benefit the ruling elite rather than the broader population. Land reform policies, for example, led to the seizure of white-owned commercial farms without compensation, resulting in a collapse of the agricultural sector and widespread economic hardships (Tshuma, 1997). Thus, Mugabe's style of leadership fueled political instability, economic challenges, and social unrest, contributing to a cycle of authoritarianism and governance crises in the country

In the Democratic Republic of Congo (1997–2003), the First and Second Congo Wars were fueled in part by winner-takes-all politics. Laurent Kabila overthrew Mobutu Sese Seko, but his failure to share power led to a second war. In both the First and Second Congo Wars, uncompromising politics contributed to power struggles, marginalization of groups, and competition over resources, exacerbating existing tensions and leading to widespread conflict and suffering in the DRC (Reid, 2023).

In Kenya (2007–2008), following the disputed 2007 elections, violence erupted between supporters of incumbent Mwai Kibaki and challenger Raila Odinga, reflecting tensions in a high-stakes political system that resulted in ethnic tensions, and a humanitarian crisis in the country (Hornsby, 2013). Ethnic politics, electoral fraud, power struggle, political exclusion and economic inequality featured prominently in the events leading to the 2007 general elections. The elections were highly contentious and marred by allegations of electoral irregularities. The aftermath of the elections highlighted the urgent need for political reforms,

including efforts to address ethnic polarization, promote inclusive governance and strong democratic institutions to prevent future crises of this nature.

The presidential election in Ivory Coast, which took place in November 2010, resulted in a political gridlock and a prolonged controversy about the election results. Incumbent President Laurent Gbagbo and opposition leader Alassane Ouattara both claimed victory in the election. Winner-takes-all politics in Ivory Coast, marked by a highly contentious electoral dispute, ethnic and regional divisions, marginalization, authoritarian rule, and external interventions, played a critical role in triggering the civil war that occurred from 2010 to 2011 (Cook, 2011)

The power struggles between Salva Kiir and Riek Machar in South Sudan since 2013 have exemplified a political environment where the victor seizes all, leading to political instability, violence, and humanitarian crises throughout the nation. The power conflicts between Salva Kiir and Riek Machar are frequently characterized as personalized politics, wherein the competition for power revolves around the two leaders and their respective factions (Okiech, 2016). This phenomenon perpetuates the belief that only one party can gain control over the government, leaving little opportunity for sharing power or reaching compromises.

In Eritrea, the lack of political pluralism has underscored absolute power politics. The country, headed by President Isaias Afwerki, has been ruled by the same political party, the People's Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ), since gaining independence in 1993. This lack of political pluralism means that there are no opposition parties or alternative political voices to challenge the ruling party. As a result, the ruling party in Eritrea has been able to maintain a monopoly on power, leading to all-or-nothing politics where the winner of the election (in this case, the ruling party) takes all power and control without significant checks and balances from opposition parties or other political actors (Ogbazghi, 2011). The absence of political pluralism in Eritrea has resulted in detrimental effects on democracy, human rights, and the general political progress of the nation. It has resulted in a restriction of political freedom, curtailed civil liberties, and fostered an atmosphere of fear and oppression that hampers the possibility of democratic governance and diverse participation in decision-making, thus impeding the meaningful involvement of alternative perspectives in the political system (Hedru, 2003).

In Burundi, the tenure extension under former president Pierre Nkurunziza highlighted dominance-oriented politics. President Nkurunziza sustained a political climate where the ruling party-the National Council for the Defence of Democracy–Forces for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD-FDD) sought to maintain control at all costs. Notwithstanding constitutional term limitations and opposition groups and civil society's objections, President Nkurunziza's highly contentious decision to compete for a third term in office in 2015 sparked nationwide demonstrations, political turmoil, and bloodshed (Kabumba, 2015). Daley and Popplewell (2016) argue that attempts to prolong his term brought to light Burundi politics as a zero-sum contest in which the ruling party cared less about the consequences of manipulating the electoral process and staying perpetually in power.

The conflict in the Anglophone regions of Cameroon, which escalated in 2016 and continues to the present day, has underscored absolute power politics in the country. The conflict originated from longstanding grievances of the Anglophone minority in Cameroon regarding political and social marginalization by the Francophone-dominated government (Pinto, 2023). The central government's approach to governance has been characterized by a lack of inclusivity, limited political pluralism, and a concentration of power in the hands of President Paul Biya and his ruling party, the Cameroon People's Democratic Movement (CPDM) (ibid).

The government's response to the grievances raised by Anglophone separatists and activists has been primarily repressive, with security forces cracking down on protests and dissent in the Anglophone regions.

In Uganda, President Yoweri Museveni's protracted leadership (1986–present) which has been characterized by the repression of opposition and constitutional amendments meant to prolong his stay in power, does highlight authoritarianism. Museveni's government has been criticized for limiting political pluralism and suppressing opposition voices. Opposition parties face challenges in organizing campaigns and participating in the political process (Mugaju & Oloka-Onyango, 2000). Due to a lack of political competition, the ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM) party controls Uganda's politics.

In Ethiopia (2018–present), Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed's centralization reforms and crackdown on Tigray's regional leaders led to the Tigray conflict (Congressional Research Service, 2021). The conflict in Tigray has exacerbated ethnic tensions and divisions in Ethiopia, with repercussions felt across the country. The centralization reforms and crackdown on Tigray's regional leaders have further heightened these tensions, leading to a polarized political environment (Halakhe, 2020). Ethnic divisions often reinforce dominance-oriented politics by deepening mistrust and hindering efforts to build consensus and inclusivity in the political system.

In Mali (since 2012), the Tuareg rebellion and the subsequent coup d'état in Mali underscored existing political, social, and economic grievances and led to a concentration of power in the hands of certain actors (Arieff, 2013). The coup d'état in Mali undermined democratic institutions and processes, including the rule of law, separation of powers, and respect for human rights. The power vacuum created by the coup allowed the military junta to assert control and sideline civilian authorities, further entrenching winner-takes-all politics by limiting political pluralism and democratic governance (Boas & Torheim, 2013)

In the Central African Republic (2012–present), the Seleka rebellion, and subsequent sectarian violence were driven by political exclusion and marginalization (Weber & Kaim, 2014). Politics that prioritize winning at all costs frequently marginalizes minority groups and widens already-existing ethnic, socioeconomic, and religious divides. In the case of the Central African Republic, the conflict between the predominantly Muslim Seleka rebels and the largely Christian anti-Balaka militias highlighted deep-seated divisions within the country (Siradag, 2016). The winner-takes-all mindset often leads to the exclusion and marginalization of certain groups, leading to grievances and fueling violence.

A major contributing cause to Libya's political instability and war has been the total victory mentality in politics. When Muammar Gaddafi was overthrown in 2011, rival factions and armed organizations fought for control, creating a power vacuum that stoked unrest and violence (Center for Preventive Action, 2023). The mindset of "winner takes all," in which the winner tries to monopolize resources and power while keeping out rival groups, has impeded efforts in Libya to create a stable and inclusive democratic order (Hill, 2020). This approach has exacerbated political, ethnic, and regional divides, hindering the country's transition to a unified and democratic governance structure.

The ongoing conflict in eastern Chad, along with the political violence that ensued after the death of President Idriss Déby, is a clear indication of the underlying tensions within a political system that is dominance-oriented (Eizenga, 2021). Winner-takes-all politics often neglects the importance of inclusive governance structures or power-sharing mechanisms. The political violence and conflict in Eastern Chad have been exacerbated by a failure to establish inclusive governance and power-sharing agreements (World Bank, 2021).

After independence, Nigeria experienced military coups and dictatorships, aggravating the winner-takes-all governing model. This has led to the concentration of power at the centre, and further fueling winner-takes-all electoral outcomes (Jega & Ibeanu, 2007). The ruling party in Nigeria often consolidates its power while opposition forces struggle to gain political power (Saka, *et al*., 2019). For example, Muhammadu Buhari (2015-2023) practised the no-power-sharing style of politics. Critics argue that his administration was marked by skewed appointments, nepotism, excessive concentration of power and patronage politics that favoured his regional constituents, close associates, and party loyalists (Nwoko, *et al*., 2022).

DISCUSSION

When political victory is seen as the only avenue to accessing state resources and services, ethnic groups may feel compelled to compete against one another rather than cooperate. This competition can become particularly fierce in ethnically diverse countries where representation and inclusion are crucial for national cohesion. In such a context, politics becomes a zero-sum game: the power and resources won by one group are viewed as being lost by another. This breeds resentment and mistrust among ethnic groups, as the stakes for political success are incredibly high. The resulting tensions can lead to social fragmentation, where ethnic identity becomes a rallying cry for political mobilization, often at the expense of national unity.

Oruwari (2007) posits that winner-takes-all politics has the potential to undermine democratic institutions by eroding the crucial checks and balances systems. This erosion can create a power concentration that fuels political instability and conflict. Adams (2020) further argues that it can also exacerbate ethnic tensions, skew resource allocation, foster exclusion of opposition groups, erode democratic institutions, incite electoral violence, deepen polarization, promote corruption, and invite foreign interference. These phenomena do not exist in isolation; rather, they are interconnected, each feeding into the next, creating a complex web of challenges for societies governed by such a system. Ethnic tensions often arise in winner-takes-all systems due to the perception, or reality, that certain ethnic groups are favoured over others.

Equally important is the aspect of resource allocation where victors prioritize their supporters, regions, and ethnic groups when distributing state resources. This can manifest in various forms, such as preferential treatment in government contracts, targeted development projects, or biased distribution of social services. This favouritism not only exacerbates regional disparities but also deepens the grievances of those who find themselves on the losing side. Unequal distribution of resources can trigger a vicious cycle where marginalized groups become more inclined to support opposition movements or engage in protest and civil disobedience, further contributing to a destabilized political environment.

The exclusion of opposition is a direct consequence of winner-takes-all politics. The lack of power-sharing mechanisms ensures that the losing parties have little to no influence over policy-making. This can lead to a sense of disenfranchisement among opposition supporters, who may feel that their voices and votes do not matter. Over time, the systematic exclusion of opposition groups can weaken the political fabric of a country by reducing diversity of thought and stifling political debate. Exclusion can also push opposition groups to resort to extra-constitutional means to be heard, including protests, strikes, or even insurrections, posing a threat to national stability.

The erosion of democratic institutions is a grave consequence of winner-takes-all politics. When one party or group maintains power over extended periods, it can lead to the entrenchment of authority and the weakening of checks and balances. This concentration of power can undermine the independence of the judiciary, the neutrality of the civil service, and the freedom of the press. As these

institutions are weakened, the fundamentals of democracy, such as the rule of law, accountability, and transparency, are compromised. The public's trust in these institutions may diminish, leading to cynicism about the democratic process and fueling further political disengagement.

Electoral violence is a particularly tragic outcome that can emerge from winner-takes-all politics. As the stakes of elections are raised to existential levels, the incentives to engage in violent tactics increase. Political actors, facing the prospect of total loss or gain, may turn to intimidation, vote-buying, or even outright violence to secure an electoral win. The tension and hostility that characterize such elections can lead to clashes between supporters of rival parties, with the post-election period often marked by unrest and sometimes bloodshed, especially if the results are contested.

Corruption is another scourge often associated with winner-takes-all politics. With so much at stake, the incentive to engage in corrupt practices increases. Political actors may resort to bribery, embezzlement, and nepotism to maintain their grip on power or to finance their political campaigns. The concentration of power that accompanies winner-takes-all politics creates fertile ground for corruption to take root, as it allows for the control of oversight mechanisms and the manipulation of legal frameworks to protect those in power.

Finally, foreign interference can present a significant concern in the winner-takes-all political system due to the potential to sway election outcomes disproportionately. In a system where the candidate or party with the most votes secures all power, even minor external influence can have a substantial impact. Foreign actors may offer financial backing to favoured candidates, enabling them to run more extensive campaigns or purchase advertising that can sway voters. Logistical support, such as organizing events or providing campaign strategy expertise, can boost a candidate's visibility and appeal. Additionally, the use of technology by foreign entities to spread disinformation, hack into election systems, or manipulate social media platforms further exacerbates the risk of interference in these high-stakes political environments.

CONCLUSION AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

Evidently, winner-takes-all (WTA) politics has exacerbated conflicts, political tensions, and instability throughout Africa. However, an emerging consensus exists that inclusive governance, power-sharing agreements, and robust institutions are crucial for maintaining peace and security. Addressing Africa's winner-takes-all (WTA) politics requires a holistic approach and innovative solutions aimed at promoting inclusivity, fairness, and representation. Below are four key suggestions to address these challenges:

Electoral Reform: Proportional representation, ranked-choice voting, or a mixed-member proportional system can reduce WTA dynamics by representing multiple opinions in governance (Ayamba, 2024). These reforms can make politics more inclusive and representative. Ghana adopted electoral reforms in 2020 to address WTA politics and strengthen democracy. The biometric voter registration system, independent electoral commission, and mixed-member proportional representation electoral system were among these innovations. The goal was to improve electoral integrity, promote fair representation, and decrease WTA dynamics.

Coalition Building: Coalition governments can reduce WTA politics by encouraging political parties to compromise and collaborate (Back *et al*., 2011). Coalition governments create more inclusive decision-making and policy outcomes that reflect diverse opinions. Kenya, Cheeseman *et al.* (2014) argue, has used coalition building to address the problem of WTA politics. After the violent 2007-2008 elections, a power-sharing agreement was reached between rival political parties. This coalition government aimed to foster inclusivity and

shared governance, thereby mitigating WTA dynamics.

Minority Representation: Implementing measures to ensure the representation of minority groups in government can help mitigate WTA dynamics (Reynolds, 2006). For example, introducing quotas for underrepresented groups or providing support for minority candidates can lead to more diverse and inclusive political representation. South Africa's electoral law specifically recognizes proportionality and minority participation (Handley, 2020). The proportional representation system gives political parties parliamentarians depending on their vote share. By giving voice to other opinions, this method increases minority representation and mitigates WTA tendencies.

Decentralization of Power: Shah and Thompson (2004) aver that devolving power to local and regional levels of government can help reduce WTA dynamics by allowing for more diverse policy approaches and fostering greater community involvement in decision-making. Decentralization can lead to more tailored governance and increased representation of local interests. To strengthen governance and end WTA tendencies, Algeria has moved towards decentralization of power (The Hunger Project, 2014). In 2019, the country enacted reforms that gave local governments greater power and independence to manage their affairs. This decentralization effort seeks to improve local development initiatives, increase inclusion in decision-making, and reduce the concentration of power at the centre.

By implementing these key solutions, African societies can work towards mitigating the WTA system of politics, fostering greater inclusivity, and ensuring that diverse voices are represented in the political process.

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